Public education expenditure varies significantly across Indian states. Using data on sixteen Indian states from 2001-2010, the paper tries to identify the determinants of per capita education expenditure of state governments in India. The econometric findings indicate that richer states spend more on education compared to the poorer states. A lower share of child population (0-14 years) is found to significantly enhance education expenditure at the state level. We do not find any evidence that political factors such as political ideology of the ruling party and level of corruption affect education expenditure of state governments.
Introduction
Education has long been regarded as one of the prime drivers of growth. Over time, many economic growth theories and models (such as Romer, 1990 and Lucas, 1988) have developed relating education and economic growth. The justification for higher government expenditure on education is based on its impact on economic growth and long-term increase in the expected income of individuals (see Levine and Renelt, 1992; Mankiw et al., 1992; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995; Duflo, 2001; Mukherjee, 2007) . From the perspective of education as a fundamental right, the case for public intervention in the education sector becomes even stronger, especially for developing countries like India.
India is a federal republic with 28 states and 7 union territories. After independence, the Constitution of India recognised education as a state subject. Though it was transferred to 1 Corresponding Author. We wish to thank Prof. Hassan Molana, Dr. Grigorios Emvalomatis and seminar participants at Economic Studies (University of Dundee) for helpful comments. The usual disclaimer applies. concurrent list (i.e. concurrent with the central government or centre) in 1976, yet the main responsibility of financing education still rested on the state governments. However, there is a lot of disparity within states in terms of expenditure on education by the respective state governments. In Table 2 , we rank the 16 Indian states used in our econometric analysis according to their respective per capita public education expenditure (Column 3) and Net State Domestic Product (NSDP) per capita (Column 5) in 2010.
Hypothetically speaking, we would expect that richer states spend more on education compared to the poorer states. Overall, the rankings achieved by the states conform to that belief. High-income states such as Haryana, Kerala and Maharashtra have some of the highest investments in education in India. But, there are exceptions too. Assam, despite being a low-income state (ranked 13 th out of the 16 states) ranks very high in terms of education spending. Himachal Pradesh ranks 1 st in terms of per capita spending but does not come even among the richest five states. 3 Some of the richest states like Tamil Nadu and Gujarat register a mediocre performance when it comes to state spending on education.
2 Plan expenditure is that part of the total budgeted expenditure which is meant for financing various education schemes and programmes proposed under Five year plans. It indicates the direction of changes in the education sector. Nonplan expenditure is the expenditure on operating and maintaining existing education infrastructure. The central government, over time, came to play an increasingly dominant role in shaping the country's education system. This led to a steady rise in the central government's Plan expenditure share, from around 40% in the early 1990s to around 63% in 2003. This, in turn, explains the increase in its share in total public education expenditure from 18.9% in 2005 to 22.2% in 2010. The state governments are primarily concerned with the Nonplan expenditure in the education sector which implies that it is the policies of the centre which shapes India's education system. See De and Endow (2008) Over the span of a decade (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) , the ranking of the states on the basis of education expenditure have not changed substantially; the only exception being Haryana which jumps from the 8 th position in 2001 to 2 nd position in 2010 (see Table 3 ). However, Haryana was also the richest Indian state in 2010. Among the low-income states, only Orissa (with a NSDP per capita only higher than Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh in 2010) does slightly better to move up from the worst performers' group into the middle category (ranks 6 th -11 th ).
The worst performing states of West Bengal, Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh continued to remain at the bottom of the ranks. and b) education policies differ between states and hence a study at the aggregate level will miss the dynamics at work at the sectoral level.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature.
Section 3 discusses the econometric models used in the study and Section 4 presents and interprets the results. Section 5 concludes.
Overview of the literature
A review of the existing literature reveals that determinants of public education expenditure go beyond the economic factors; demographic and political determinants too play a significant role.
Economic Factors
The public expenditure-economic growth link was first postulated by the German political economist Adolf Wagner (Lamartina and Zaghini, 2010 
Demographic Factors
The effect of demographic characteristics on education expenditure is slightly ambiguous. 5 Mehrotra (2004) , in India's context, states that even if some backward states attach high priority to education, larger number of school-going children probably reduces their per capita spending on education. However, it can also be the case that a state with a larger child population is spending more on education than a state with ageing population because the former has the incentive to reap the benefits of a potential demographic dividend.
The international literature on the issues of demographic characteristics and public education expenditure can be broadly categorised into two groups. One group of papers analyse the potential competition between the elderly and younger segments of the population for public resources. The other group examines the link between size of the young population and education finance (Grob and Wolter, 2005) .
Intergenerational Conflict in the context of Public Education Expenditure
It is generally assumed that an individual's preference for a public service is determined by whether that person is likely to be a direct user of the service. This implies that different groups of voters compete for shares of the public budget and a rising share of elderly voters in the population should hypothetically lead to a fall in public education expenditure. That is because the needs of elderly people differ from that of the younger population and, consequently, the former will prefer higher investments in areas (other than education) which benefit them directly.
The international evidence is quite mixed on this issue. Using panel data for the states of the United States for 1960 -1990 , Poterba (1997 finds that an increase in the share of elderly residents in a jurisdiction is associated with a significant reduction in per-child educational spending. Harris et al. (2001) also find that a growing share of elderly at the state level tends to depress state spending on education in United States. Many European studies such as Borge and Rattsø (1995) , Grob and Wolter (2005) and Borge and Rattsø (2008) report similar negative relationship for Norway, Switzerland and Denmark respectively. On the other hand, there are studies which refute this claim. Strömberg (1998) argues that altruism can reduce intergenerational conflicts. Duncombe et al. (2003) say that majority of studies on this issue have used aggregate data that do not provide specific evidence on preferences of elderly people, and assume that all elders are similar in their views. They find that elderly with grandchildren are more likely to support school spending than those without.
Size of Young Population and Public Education Expenditure
Most empirical studies find that it is a disadvantage to be part of a large cohort. This is understandable since cost of providing education increases with the increase in student population. The government has to spend more on building schools, employ additional teachers and give more aid. Using data on 48 US states from 1960 , She (2004 finds that percentage of young population (aged 5 to 17 years) has a negative impact on education spending. This finding is consistent with other major studies on US in this field such as
Porterba (1997) and Fernandez and Rogerson (1997 
Political factors
Political factors are also regarded as important determinants of public spending on education.
Many past studies show that factors such as the political ideology of the ruling party determine the level of government intervention in the economy and thus influence government decisions regarding expenditure on development (Hibbs, 1977; Alesina, 1987; Boix, 1998) . 6 Besides political ideology, corruption can be another crucial determinant.
Corruption affects the public provision of social services such as health and education (Gupta et al., 2000) . The more the corruption in a particular state, the more the government in that state will be potentially inclined to spend in sectors such as infrastructure projects where corruption opportunities are abundant, rather than on education where the opportunities are much more limited (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993; Mauro, 1998) .
Hence, we control for economic, demographic and political variables while assessing the determining factors for public education spending in Indian states. The econometric model used in the paper has been explained in the following section.
Model Specification and Variable Description
We conduct our analysis using data on 16 Indian states from 2001-2010. Other states could not be included because of data limitations. However, it should be noted that our sample includes all the major states of India and covers about 91% of the total population.
Per capita state expenditure on education has been used as the dependent variable in our model. We do not work with the absolute value of the education expenditure in order to control for the state size. For example, larger states like Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh spend more on education compared to smaller states such as Kerala and Himachal Pradesh in absolute terms. However, the picture is quite the opposite if we look at the per capita expenditure which, we believe, is a more effective indicator than aggregate values (see Table   2 ).
The initial econometric model used in this paper looks as follows: 'LOANpc' can also be regarded as a political variable because loans are often negotiated politically between Centre and state and repayment is sometimes waived. The variable is defined as gross loans from Centre minus repayment of loans to the Centre. See Table 7 in the Appendix for data sources.
turn, lowering developmental expenditure (Chhibber and Nooruddin, 2004) . Hence, given
Congress or 'CENTRIST' is the control category, we expect the coefficients on 'RIGHT', 'LEFT' and 'Regional' to be negative. We also include a time trend ('TREND') in our model.
All the economic variables are expressed in their natural logarithms apart from 'LOANpc' since this variable takes the value of zero for some states in some years. So we kept the variable in levels to avoid losing observations. The estimation results of Equation 1 are reported in Table 5 .
We also wanted to use child population share (defined as % of total population below 14 years) as a control for the demographic features of a state in Equation 1. But this variable could not be included because data is not available for all years (Population Census is conducted every ten years in India). However, a scatterplot analysis reveals that there might be a negative correlation between child population and per capita education spending in India. Pradesh, who spend the highest on education, are the least corrupt states (see Figure 2) . 8 The study, covering a total of 14,405 respondents from 20 Indian states, aimed to capture the level of "petty corruption" that the common man faced in obtaining 11 different public services such as Education (up to 12th Std.), Police, Land Records & Registration, Electricity, Water Supply, Government Hospitals, Income Tax, Public Distribution System, Judiciary, Municipal Services and Rural Financial Institutions. The indices were constructed using both the perception of corruption and actual experiences of paying bribes for obtaining public services. The respondent's perceptions and experiences of corruption were assigned weights of 40 and 60 percent respectively. See Table 9 in Appendix for the ranking of Indian states by this study. The only way that demographic characteristics and corruption could be included in our econometric model is by assuming that these are time invariant variables. We argue that this assumption will not be so unrealistic in the context of our analysis where the time period is just ten years. That is because factors such as demographic characteristics and level of corruption take time to change significantly and hence it could be safely assumed that the relative ranking of the Indian states on the basis on these two criteria will stay more or less the same over a span of a decade (ten years). However, with such time invariant variables in the model, the fixed effects method becomes ineffective. The random effects model also could not be used because it assumes that the individual (or, time invariant) effects are uncorrelated with other explanatory variables. If that assumption is not met, the estimator becomes inconsistent. An alternative approach is to add the group means of the independent variables (which vary within groups) to the model. This technique was proposed by Mundlak (1978) as a way to relax the aforesaid assumption in the random-effects estimator. In a general form, a random effects model can be written as yit=αt+βxit+ci+uit (2) where, xit is the explanatory variable, ci is the time-invariant individual effect and uit is the error term. A random effects estimation requires Cov(ci, xit) = 0 which is unlikely in our case since there is high probability that corruption level will be correlated with variables like state income. According to Mundlak (1978) , if Cov(uit, xit) ≠ 0 then ci= Ω + δx̄i+ ai (3) where, x̄i= group mean of the explanatory variable.
Plugging (3) into (2), we get yit= αt+βxit+ δx̄i+ai+uit (4) where, Ω gets absorbed into the time intercepts.
So, we re-estimate our model using this approach in order to include controls for demography and corruption. Our final model is expressed as follows.
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LEDEXPpcit= β0 + β1LNSDPpcit + β2LTAXpcit + β3LGRANTpcit + β4LOANpcit + β5Mean_LNSDPpci + β6Mean_LTAXpci + β7Mean_LGRANTpci + β8Mean_LOANpci + β9LPOPi + β10CORRUPTIONi + eit (5) where, 'LPOP' and 'CORRUPTION' stand for child population share (0 to 14 years) and TI-CMS Corruption Index for Indian states respectively.
Results and Discussion

Initial Model Estimation (Equation 1)
We start by checking whether Random Effects model (REM) or Fixed Effects model (FEM)
should be used. The Hausman test ruled in favour of the FEM. But we detected the problem of first order autocorrelation in our FEM estimation results so we do not draw any inference from our FEM results and instead we re-estimate the model using Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) method. FGLS method allows estimation in the presence of first-order 10 We do find any evidence that political ideology of the ruling party influences education spending by state governments (see results in the next section) and consequently we drop it from the final model, Equation 5. autocorrelation within panels, heteroskedasticity or cross-sectional correlation across panels.
However, there can be potential reverse causality bias in our FGLS results if there is a causality running from state education expenditure towards economic growth. In that case, NSDPpc will not be exogenous anymore and the results obtained will not be reliable for drawing any inference. So, we also estimate an Instrumental Variable Regression using twostage least squares (2SLS) method to control for the potential reverse causality. The econometric results are presented below. A trend variable has been included in the model. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are used for FEM and IV estimation. According to Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) estimates, our model does not suffer from the multicollinearity problem. ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Education expenditure by the state governments increases with an increase in state income (NSDPpc). Loans from centre also come out to be a statistically significant determinant of education expenditure however the effect seems to be negligible. The effect of political ideology seems to be fragile in expenditure decisions which are consistent with Chhibber and Nooruddin (2004) who also try to assess whether political ideologies matter in the context of spending decisions by state governments in India. We find some evidence that "LEFT" parties-led state governments spend less than Congress-led state governments on education but the result is sensitive to different estimation methods. The political ideology variables jointly also came out to be statistically insignificant in IV estimation and were consequently dropped from the final model (see Equation 5 ).
A major drawback of these methods (FEM, FGLS and IV 2SLS) is that we could not include controls for demographic characteristics and corruption in our model. Therefore, we refrain from deriving any conclusion from the results presented in Table 5 since there is ample international evidence, as discussed in the previous section, that factors such as demographic characteristics play a significant role in determining public spending.
Final Model Estimation (Mundlak's Approach)
We incorporate child population share and TI-CMS corruption index as proxies for demography and corruption respectively in our model and re-estimate using Mundlak's approach (see Equation 5 above). The finding, NSDP per capita is a significant determinant of public education expenditure, is robust to different model specifications and estimation methods. Other economic variables such as tax revenue and grants received from centre also increase spending on education significantly. There is a negative association between per capita education expenditure and share of child population. In other words, a larger share of children (0 to14 years) in total population is one of the reasons why states like Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan spend less on education compared to the rest of the Indian states. As we saw earlier in Table 2 , these states are lagging behind most of the other states in terms of economic growth too. Based on these findings, it can probably be asserted that the future of India's demographic dividend looks dim. That is because the population of the rich states are slowly aging and the fastest growth in the working age population is going to take place in Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and Madhya Pradesh after Haryana over the next two decades. Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and Madhya Pradesh will have roughly one-third (around 31.3%) of India's working population in 2026 (Thakur, 2012) . 12 Further investment in education is needed in these states to reap the benefits of this growing working age population. 13 This, in turn, will translate into higher human capital stock and ensure faster economic growth in future.
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12 See There is a negative association between child population share (0-14 years, as percentage of total population) and education expenditure. The states with the largest share of child population in India are Madhya Pradesh, Bihar and Uttar Pradesh. These are also the poorest states in India with the most underinvested education sectors in the country. Over the next two decades, these states will experience the fastest growth in the working age population among all the Indian states. Given this scenario, it can be argued that the future prospects of India's Demographic Dividend look dim. The governments in those states need to implement
14
We also wanted to use income inequality as a proxy for corruption. For a detailed discussion on how income inequality can lead to corruption in democratic states, see You and Khagram (2004) . But Charron (2010) does not find inequality to be a significant determinant of corruption in Indian states. So, we do not include this variable in our study.
widespread reforms in the education sector to reap the benefits of this growing youth population.
One may argue that, in India's case, there is ample empirical evidence that private schools are more efficient than public schools in imparting learning (Desai et al, 2008; French and Kingdon, 2010; Pal and Kingdon, 2010) . Hence the expected policy implication should be to let more private schools to be opened, instead of focusing on education expenditure by state governments. However, private schools charge a fee which families from poor economic backgrounds struggle to pay. Private schools, just like any other private enterprise, operate for profits and so it is unlikely that such schools will open in poor and backward areas of the country. It is not unusual when Pal (2010) finds that private schools are more likely to be present in villages with better off households and better infrastructural facilities. In a developing country like India, where, in 2010, 32.7% of the population was still below the poverty line 15 (World Development Indicators, 2012) and 26% of the children of lower secondary school age could not attend school (UNESCO Institute for Statistics, 2010) it is the government which has to ensure access to education for all. This will also help achieve "universal elementary education" (one of the Millennium Development Goals, MDGs) and ensure more inclusive growth in the long run.
Finally, we acknowledge the fact that increasing education expenditure per se will not guarantee an increase in human capital stock and a higher economic growth rate. The quality of education is equally important, which has to be ensured by providing sufficient number of qualified teachers in public schools, teaching aids, sufficient textbooks (with other learning aids) and other necessary amenities. But even to ensure good quality, raising the level of public expenditure in education is absolutely essential (Ghosh, 2011) .
